International Lawyer
Volume 30

Number 3

Article 4

1996

Antitrust Regulation in Latin America
Jaime F. Fernandez

Recommended Citation
Jaime F. Fernandez, Antitrust Regulation in Latin America, 30 INT'L L. 521 (1996)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol30/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

JAIME

E.

FERNANDEZ*

Antitrust Regulation in

Latin America
Although traditionally antitrust enforcement in Latin America has been weak
and sporadic, the level of antitrust enforcement has increased recently with the
economic liberalization. The importance of regulation stems from the fact that
the economic model in vogue in Latin America until the late 1970s generated a
highly protected and concentrated domestic industry in which anticompetitive
practices were commonplace. The liberalization of Latin American economies
could require a crackdown on anticompetitive practices, especially on price-fixing
and collusion.
The opening of economies to international competition should be an important
corrective mechanism. Antitrust enforcement will still be necessary, however,
in those areas that remain heavily concentrated after liberalization. Typically,
areas where heavy capital outlays are necessary to enter the market and where
few enterprises were present before the opening of the economy will need to be
subject to tighter scrutiny. Furthermore, as the economies of the region open to
international competition, domestic companies face competitive pressure either
to form alliances with foreign (usually large multinational) companies desiring
to enter the market or with other domestic companies to meet international competition. As a result, the review of mergers and acquisitions by government bodies
will probably increase. In their review of proposed mergers and acquisitions,
these bodies will need to determine whether the relevant market is the domestic
market, a subregional market, such as the Andean Pact or Mercosur, or the
worldwide market. As is the case with other forms of government intervention
in the economy, it is possible that these bodies may misuse their authority and
block the entry of international competitors by not authorizing their acquisition
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article in any not-forprofit publication or handout provided such reproduction acknowledges original publication in this
issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the author.
*The author is a member of the international practice group of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt &
Mosle, New York, New York.
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of domestic companies that supply the necessary operational capacity or local
expertise.
This article reviews the antitrust laws of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico. Whereas in Argentina the antitrust law adopts a rule of reason
approach, in Chile antitrust violations stem from conduct that has been considered
per se illegal by the enforcement bodies, while other violations require a rule
of reason determination. In Brazil the antitrust law requires a showing of market
power, with a 20 percent market share threshold (recently reduced from the
original 30 percent). Mexico adopts a mixed system of rule of reason and per
se violations. Colombia represents a jurisdiction where antitrust enforcement
remains largely unknown. The Andean Pact competition regulation, which is
inactive, is reviewed in the section on Colombia.
I. Competition Regulation in Argentina
Antitrust regulation has seldom been enforced in Argentina, even though antitrust laws have been on the books for more than sixty-five years.' With the strong
liberalization measures adopted by the current government, antitrust enforcement
could increase. Antitrust is often seen as complementing privatization, by preventing abuses of market power by newly privatized industries without having
to resort to direct regulation of prices and quantities. However, it is also likely
that the market power of domestic economic units will decrease as the economy
is opened to foreign competition, thus making the active enforcement of the
antitrust laws less necessary or even undesirable.
One explanation for Argentina's failure to actively enforce its antitrust laws
is the high evidentiary burden required to prove a violation. For conduct to
constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, it must have the effect of restricting
competition. A showing of market impact is required and there are no per se
violations. This showing would normally require fairly complex economic data,
the use of concentration indices, and the like. To date, there is no official indication
of the type of measures that would be used. Furthermore, the administration of
a rule of reason system is much more demanding technically, procedurally, and
financially.
A.

REGULATION OF COMPETITION

The Competition Law contains a broad provision prohibiting conduct that
restricts, distorts, or limits competition, or that constitutes an abuse of a dominant
position in the market. 2 A person or company is said to have a dominant position
in the market when it is the only purchaser or supplier of a particular product
1. Investing, Licensing and Trading Conditions Abroad: Argentina (Economist Intelligence
Unit) § 5.1 (1995).
2. Ley 22.262 de Defensa de la Competencia [Competition Law] art. 1 (Aug. 1, 1980).
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or service or when it is not subject to "substantial competition" in all or part
of the country. The Competition Law focuses on behavior that has the effect of
restricting competition. However, it creates an exception for practices undertaken
pursuant to a legal authorization or command. 4 This defense can be invoked
especially in cases involving patent holders or public enterprises. 5 This exception
only reaches practices legally validated 6 and does not extend to other practices
of the same entity.'
1. Specific Prohibitions
The Competition Law contains the following nonexhaustive list of practices
that are violations if they have the effect of restricting competition:'
* Price-fixing through agreements or any form of concerted action; 9
" fixing, influencing, or changing market prices;' °
" concerted action to establish minimum quantities, discounts, or other conditions for the sale of goods or services;"
" sharing information on prices or conditions of sale in order to promote
concerted action to restrict competition;2
or concerted action allocating clients or territories among
* any agreement
3
competitors;'
* agreements or concerted action to allocate markets or suppliers among com4
petitors;'
* concerted action to limit or control the production or distribution of goods
or services;' 5

3. Id.art. 2.
4. Id.art. 5.
5. Jorge Otamendi, Criteriosde la Comisi6n Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia, LA LEY
758-59 (1982-D).
6. Judgment of October 31, 1985 (Colegio de Martilleros y Corredores Ptiblicos del Departamento Judicial de Mar de Plata), Buenos Aires SC (Arg.).
7. Otamendi, supra note 5, at 758.
8. Competition Law art. 41. Article 41 should be analyzed by reference to article 1, which
prohibits all conduct having the effect of restricting competition. See, e.g., Alejandro Adrian Litvack,
La Obligaci6nde Vender y la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, LA LEY 469 (t. 1992-C) (explaining
that the article 41 provisions on refusal to deal should be analyzed in light of article 1, and, in
particular, in light of the anticompetitive effects of the refusal).
9. The Competition Law does not prohibit the agreement as such, but regulates the anticompetitive effects that may result from such agreement or concerted behavior. This result is due to the fact
that article 41 provisions should be read in the context of article 1, which requires an anticompetitive
effect. See Jorge Otamendi, Presupuestos Bdsicos Para la Aplicaci6n de la Ley de Defensa de la
Competencia, LA LEY (1981-B).
10. Competition Law art. 41(a).
11.Id.art. 41(c).
12. Id. art. 41(k).
13. Id. art. 41(e).
14. Id.
15. Id.art. 41(b).
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concerted action to prevent investment or technological improvement in the
production of goods or services;' 6
agreements or any form of concerted action to prevent entry of competitors
into the market; 7 this prohibition extends to the concerted use of prices or
other mechanisms to prevent entry;' 8
concerted action to abandon or destroy products, crops, or livestock;' 9
concerted action to stop operations in industries or mines;2 °
concerted refusals to fulfill particular product orders entered under existing
market conditions, except when such refusals are part of "accepted commercial practice";21 this provision probably does not apply to exclusive dealing
agreements between producers and distributors; a strong argument can be
made that these exclusive dealing arrangements fall within accepted commer2
cial practice;
discrimination in the sale of products or services, except in
cases where
23
discrimination is dictated by accepted commercial practice;
tying arrangements; the Competition Law prohibits linking a contract to the
24
performance of obligations or operations that are not related to its object;
this is the only violation in the (nonexhaustive) list of prohibited practices that
applies in situations where there is no concerted action; the other violations
in this list of practices involve conduct undertaken in concert with other persons or companies.

2. Enforcement Procedures
The Competition Law is enforced through an administrative procedure that
can lead to administrative sanctions and, or alternatively, to civil or criminal
judicial proceedings. The administrative proceeding is initiated by the National
Commission for the Defense of Competition (Commission) ex officio or upon
a complaint presented by a private party. 25 The Commission is the body charged
with antitrust enforcement in Argentina.
Once an administrative procedure is initiated, the party accused of a violation
16. Id.
17. Id.art. 41(f).
18. Cf. Horacio P. Fargosi, Apostilla Sobre la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, ADLA XL-C
2533.
19. Competition Law art. 41(i), (j).
20. Id. It is not clear whether the prohibition of article 41, section k, against concerted action
to stop operations of mines or industries would apply to oil production. The text uses the terms
establecimientos industriales(industries) and yacimientos mineros (mines), which could be applied,
albeit not without some imprecision, to the oil industry.
21. Competition Law art. 41(g).
22. There is no exact definition of accepted commercial practice. This definition must be determined on a case-by-case basis and is a factual rather than a legal question.
23. Competition Law art. 41(h).
24. Id.art. 41(d).
25. Id.art. 17.
VOL. 30, NO. 3
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has two weeks to explain its conduct. If the explanations are unsatisfactory, the
accused may seek a voluntary settlement with the Commission. If no settlement
can be reached, the Secretary of Commerce may issue an order to cease the
violation, impose a fine, or issue a request to a court to proceed to liquidate
the enterprise.26 The decision of the Secretary of Commerce must include an
explanation of the basis of the ruling,27 and it can be appealed in federal court.28
The Secretary of Commerce, in this context, serves as a second-instance administrative judicial board. The issue will go to the courts only after the administrative
procedures have been exhausted, both in the Commission and with the Secretary
of Commerce.
The directors, auditors, agents, and managers of companies that participated
in a violation contemplated in the list of prohibited practices are subject to criminal
prosecution. Criminal action, however, can be initiated in the courts only by
the Secretary of Commerce. Sanctions for these transgressions range from fines
to a prison sentence for a maximum of six years. Criminal sanctions have seldom,
if ever, been imposed for violations of the antitrust laws in Argentina.
The Competition Law provides a private cause of action to recover damages.
Any person harmed by the anticompetitive actions contemplated in the Competition Law can bring an action to recover damages once an administrative decision
by the Secretary of Commerce has been issued approving a settlement, imposing
sanctions, or dismissing the charges.30
3. Other Provisions
The Supply Law is closely related to past government policies of heavy intervention in the economy in the 1970s. Its objective is to set minimum prices for goods
and services consumed by large sectors of the population. However, the Supply
Law also contains provisions to prevent restrictions on the supply of goods or
services in an economy with price controls. Some of the provisions in the Supply
Law are per se violations, not requiring conduct of a monopolistic nature. The
Supply Law prohibits unjustified price increases, hoarding of finished goods or
raw materials, reducing supply in order to cause scarcity of a product, and unjustified refusals to deal. 3' Transgressions of these provisions are punished by fines,
suspension of trademark and patent rights, arrest, and temporary closure of the
business.32

26. Id. art. 26.
27. If an explanation of the basis for the ruling is missing, the decision can be annulled by the
courts. Judgment of April 6, 1990 (A Gas, S.A. y otras c. Agip Argentina, S.A. y otras), C.N.
Penal Econ6mico, no. 89.017 (Arg.).
28. Competition Law art. 27.
29. Id. art. 42, § 2.
30. Id. art. 4.
31. Ley 20.680 [Supply Law] art. 4 (June 20, 1974), amended by RESOLUcl6N 140 (1989).
32. Id. art. 5.
FALL 1996
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The Supply Law and the Competition Law overlap in several instances. In
practice, the Competition Law provisions are more likely to be applied to regulate
anticompetitive behavior. However, this remains an open issue. Because enforcement of these laws has been sporadic, it is difficult to predict how they will be
interpreted and enforced in the future.
In keeping with the trend towards economic liberalization, the prices of the
products covered by the Supply Law were liberated toward the end of 1989,
except as to pharmaceutical products.33 Although the Supply Law is still in force,
its application has been drastically reduced. Further, it is unlikely that price
controls will be adopted in the near future, given the free market orientation of
the current administration.
In 1993 the Argentine Congress passed a new consumer protection law. Unlike
the consumer protection laws of other countries in Latin America, this law does
not regulate antitrust behavior as such. Nevertheless, it does require transparency
with regard to product34information supplied to the market, which in itself has a
procompetitive effect.
B.

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

The Competition Law does not explicitly regulate mergers and acquisitions.
The Competition Law prohibits conduct that restricts competition or that constitutes an abuse of a dominant position in the market. Accordingly, a merger
or acquisition could be a violation of the general prohibitions contained in the
Competition Law if it had the effect of restricting competition. The Competition
Law probably has never been applied to prevent or alter a merger or acquisition.
The formal requirements for a merger are established in the Commercial
Code.3 The requirements for a merger include: a "prior commitment of merger"
adopted by the representatives of the company containing information necessary
for the shareholders to assess the convenience of the merger; a resolution approving the "prior commitment of merger" adopted in the same manner as an amendment to the corporate charter; and notice of the resolution by publication in a
periodical of national circulation. Creditors have an opportunity to oppose the
merger within fifteen days of notice and they may seek a judicial embargo against
it.
C.

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

As a general principle, manufacturers can set the minimum or maximum prices
at which their distributors must sell to the public. However, such action will not
33. RESOLUCI6N 140 (1989).

34. Ley 24.240 de Defensa del Consumidor [Consumer Protection Law] (Sept. 22, 1993).
35. These requirements are set forth in the Corporations Law in arts. 82-83. For an English

translation, see COMMERCIAL

1996).
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be permitted if it limits, restricts, or distorts competition, or constitutes abuse
of a dominant market position in such a way that it can be detrimental to general
economic interests.

D.

JOINT VENTURES

Joint ventures are permitted under Argentine law. They will violate the Competition Law only if they have the effect of restricting competition or if they abuse
a dominant position. No specific provisions regulate the antitrust aspects of joint
ventures in Argentina.
The formal requirements for joint ventures are set forth in the Argentine Corporations Law.36 A joint venture contract must be in writing and must be registered
in the Public Commercial Register. A copy of the contract must be sent to the
National Commission for the Defense of Competition. The Commission can
initiate an antitrust investigation if the joint venture appears to restrict competition
or to assume a dominant position.
The Competition Law has seldom, if ever, been applied to prevent or alter a
joint venture in Argentina.
E.

APPLICABLE LAWS

(i) Ley 24.240 de defensa del consumidor, of September 22, 1993 (Consumer
Protection Law).
(ii) Ley 22.262 de defensa de la competencia, of August 1, 1980 (Competition
Law). The Competition Law prohibits various forms of abuse of market
power.
(iii) Ley 20.680, of June 20, 1974 (Supply Law), as modified by Resoluci6n 140,
of 1989. The Supply Law prohibits the manipulation of prices or quantities by
producers or distributors. The Supply Law was modified in 1989 and currently applies only to pharmaceutical products.
(iv) Ley 19.550, of April 25, 1972 (Corporations Law). The Corporations Law
establishes the formal requirements for mergers and joint ventures.
II. Competition Regulation in Brazil
The Brazilian Congress approved a new antitrust law in June 1994, completely
overhauling the previous legislation. Three statutes were revoked and the remaining ones were substantially modified. The prior Brazilian competition laws
were repetitive and complex. They addressed widely different practices ranging
from fiscal evasion to disobedience of government price controls, and from false
advertising to the recognition of foreign patents. They also regulated dumping
and included provisions to prevent selling at prices that were too high, at cost,
36. Ley 19,550 [Corporations Law] arts. 367-383 (Apr. 25, 1972).
FALL 1996
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or below cost. The new antitrust law simplified the regulatory framework and
strengthened the mechanisms of enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Because of the close, and often criticized, relationship between the private
sector and the state, antitrust enforcement in Brazil has traditionally been weak.37
This relationship often forces enterprises to act collectively to negotiate concessions from the government. This collective action may have encouraged collusive
behavior in the past.38 Whether the current government will enforce the competition laws more forcefully is unclear, although indications are that antitrust enforcement will become more prevalent. The adoption of the new antitrust law by the
Brazilian Congress seems to indicate a heightened awareness of the need for
enforcement. In addition, the recent decision of the Administrative Council for
Economic Defense (CADE), an administrative body with quasi-judicial functions
in charge of antitrust enforcement, required the exclusion of the acrylic and
polyester units as a condition to approving the acquisition of Sinasa, a polyester
manufacturer, by Rhodia, a chemical products company. CADE concluded that
the acquisition would generate a monopoly in the production of polyester.39 In
a more recent decision, CADE rejected a project by two asbestos companies,
Brasilit and Eternit, which would have created a joint venture in Southern Brazil
for the production of asbestos tiles and water tanks, on the grounds that the
project would result in an increase in concentration that could harm competition
nationwide. 4° These decisions, along with the enactment of the new law, may
indicate a tougher and more active enforcement of antitrust law in Brazil.
The Brazilian competition laws were initially inspired by the American antitrust
laws. 4 The terms contained within the Brazilian laws are often clarified by reference to their meaning in English. In an early decision, for example, the notions
of vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate integration were defined in English by
citing an American textbook. 42 In another decision, "vertical integration" was
defined by making reference to an American antitrust text,43 and the judge cited
the book of two American professors, considering them "experts" in the field
of antitrust. 44 In another decision, the judge used the criteria set forth in the
American Alcoa case 45 to establish that vertical integration that seeks to control
37. "Despite the antimonopoly laws, Brazil in fact has a long history of encouraging anticompetitive practices." Investing, Licensing and Trading Conditions Abroad: Brazil (Economist
Intelligence Unit) 14 (1993).
38. 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 504 (Apr. 29, 1993).
39. See Brazil: Competitive Pit Bull, Bus. LATIN AM., Nov. 7, 1994.
40. For a review of this case, see Camila D.M.P. de Araujo &Jaime E. Fernandez, New Brazilian
Antitrust Law, INT'L FIN. LAW REV. 61 (Apr. 1995).
41. FRANCESCHINI & FRANCESCHINI, PODER EcONOMICO: EXERCICIO E ABUSO, DIREITO
ANTITRUSTE BRASILEIRO 1

42.
at 61.
43.
44.
45.

(1985).

Judgment of June 9, 1971, Processo Admin. no. 6 (Arg.); FRANCESCHtNI, supra note 41,
FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41, at

Id.
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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the upstream or downstream markets can be a violation of the antitrust laws. 46
Considering the frequent references to American authors, it would not be surprising if Brazilian laws in the future applied numerical indexes or other criteria
applied in the United States to measure concentration. CADE, for example, has
applied the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index to determine the existence of high
levels of concentration in national or local markets.
A.

REGULATION OF COMPETITION

For organizational purposes this section is divided according to the enforcement
body. Section 1 contains a description of the practices regulated by the competition
laws. Section 2 deals with the institutional and procedural framework of enforcement.
1. PracticesRegulated by the Competition Laws
a. Practices Enforceable Directly in Criminal Court
Law 8.137/90 establishes criminal sanctions for violations against "the economic order." It prohibits abuses of market power47 where acquisitions or mergers
with competing enterprises are carried out with the intent to cease or reduce
production or impede the functioning of a competing enterprise. a In Brazil,
market power had previously been defined as the power to determine prices in
a market. 49 The law enacted in 1994 defines market power as the control of a
substantial portion of the market by an enterprise or group of enterprises.50 The
1994 law (as modified) establishes a rebuttable presumption that market power
exists whenever the control extends to 20 percent or more of the relevant market.
If this definition of market power contained in the new law is applicable to Law
8.137/90, then the criminal practices requiring market power are not criminal
violations whenever the enterprise controls less than 20 percent of the relevant
market.
Regardless of market power, it is a criminal violation to enter into the following
agreements or collusive arrangements: (a) to fix prices; (b) to allocate markets;
(c) to control sources of supplies or channels of distribution to the detriment of

46. Judgment of Mar. 22, 1971, Processo no. 20.049 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41, at
96-97.
47. Referred to in the law as "dominant position."
48. Law 8.137/90, art. 4.
49. Judgment of June 9, 1971, Processo Admin. no. 6 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41,
at 143. Although the decisions cited by Franceschini deal with the 1962 antitrust law, because of
the technical nature of the field, it is likely that many of the notions contained therein also apply
under the newer statutes. This article cites the relevant decisions from Franceschini to interpret the
language of the newer antitrust laws. Administrative and judicial decisions do not have the force of
law in Brazil and should only be considered as valuable guidelines to interpret the competition laws.
50. Law No. 8.884, of June 11, 1994, art. 20, §§ 2, 3, amended by Law 9.096/95 [hereinafter
Law 8.884/94].
FALL 1996
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competition; (d) to hoard or destroy products in order to create a monopoly; or
(e) to set prices in order to harm competitors. 5 It is likewise a crime to tie the
sale of a product or service to the purchase of a different product or service; to
favor, without adequate justification, one purchaser over another (unless one of
the purchasers is a distributor of the producer's goods); or in the case of goods
that are subject to price controls, to sell at a price that is higher than the official
price. 52 All of these criminal violations require a mental state equivalent to scienter.53 The enforcement of the criminal provisions in Law 8.137/90 is assigned
to the criminal courts. However, enforcement of these provisions is relatively
rare.
b. Practices Enforced by CADE
Law 8.884/94 provides that it is a violation of the "economic order," 5 4 regardless of intent, to engage in any conduct with the effect of the following: (i)
harming competition; (ii) dominating the relevant market of goods or services;
(iii) increasing profits in an arbitrary manner, unless the company's position in
the market is a result of a "natural competitive process;"" and (iv) abusing a
dominant position in the market. 56 "Market domination" implies that an enter57
prise or group of enterprises controls a substantial share of the relevant market.
The statute (as modified) establishes the presumption that the control of 20 percent
of the market constitutes a dominant position. 5 ' The violation of increasing profits
in an arbitrary manner has been interpreted in decisions under previous statutes
to encompass any situation in which one of the parties arbitrarily sets the price,
that is, when there is no participation of the other parties in the formation of the
price. 9
Law 8.884/94 includes a list of practices that constitute a transgression whenever they fall within the categories contemplated in (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv), described
above. These practices include:
" price-fixing and other forms of concerted behavior among competitors;
" creating obstacles to the formation or development of a competing enterprise;
* erecting barriers to the entry of competitors;

51. Law 8.137/90, art. 4.
52. Id. arts. 5-7.
53. Id. art. 7, paragrafo unico.
54. Ordem Economica.
55. Law 8.884/94, art. 20, § 1.
56. Id. art. 20.
57. Id.
58. The 30% threshold originally in the law was changed to 20% by Provisional Measure No.
911 of February 21, 1995, and permanently incorporated into the antitrust law by Law 9.069/95.
59. Sentenca de 29.10.41, do Juiz do TSN Pedro Borges, no Porc. n. 1765, In RF 89/217 e
ss; voto vencido de 29.4.41 da 2 Cam. Crim. do TJSP, na Ap. n. 11956, de Santos, Apud RT 132/
227 e ss (profits are arbitrary whenever they depend exclusively on one of the parties to the transaction).
FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41, at 404-12.
VOL. 30, NO. 3
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* limiting the access of competitors to raw materials or equipment or to the
channels of distribution;
" hoarding or impeding access by competitors to patents and technology;
* demanding exclusive advertising rights;
" coordinating bids in public auction;
* market allocations;
* suppressing competing technologies;
* refusals to deal not justified by normal commercial practice;
" tying the sale of a product to the purchase of another product;
* imposing resale prices or resale conditions on a distributor;
* destroying or hoarding a product to elevate its market price;
* artificially causing prices to oscillate;
* selling a product below cost without justification; and
" interrupting production or operations without justification.'
These are strict liability provisions, since intent is not necessary to constitute
the transgression. The law seeks to correct anticompetitive conduct, rather than
punish wrongful intentions.
2. Enforcement Mechanisms
Law 8.884/94 establishes an administrative procedure to prevent and correct
conduct that restricts competition. The Secretary for Economic Regulation
(SDE) 61 can investigate and make a preliminary determination of the existence
of practices contrary to the antitrust laws. Either ex officio, or in response to a
private party's complaint, the SDE can audit a company to investigate its compliance with the antitrust laws and require the company to correct its conduct. A
company must either comply with the required corrections or be subject to daily
fines.
Once it has initiated an investigation for anticompetitive practices, the SDE
must notify the party within eight days. The party has two weeks to respond.
The SDE has broad powers of investigation and discovery during the course of
the proceedings. Upon gathering the relevant information, the SDE will either
desist or order provisional corrective measures that the party must adopt, imposing
daily fines as necessary. If the SDE makes a preliminary determination that there
has been a violation, it will initiate proceedings with CADE for administrative
adjudication.62
The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), created in 1962,
was revamped in the 1994 Antitrust Law. CADE is an administrative judicial
board with competence to judge violations and impose sanctions for antitrust
violations in Brazil. The decisions of CADE cannot be appealed through adminis60. Law 8.884/94, art. 20.
61. Secretaria de Direito Economico.
62. Law 8.884/94, art. 14.
FALL 1996
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trative channels, only directly to the courts.63 If CADE declares that a violation
has taken place and orders corrective measures, the guilty party has to comply
within the time period indicated by CADE. If a party does not comply, CADE
can impose fines and will initiate judicial proceedings to enjoin compliance.64
Law 8.884/94 established a consultation mechanism whereby private parties
could direct inquiries to CADE seeking an administrative opinion on a particular
behavior. 65 This mechanism of private consultation was unfortunately abolished
by Law 9.069/95.66
The Consumer Protection Law of 1990 provides for individual and class actions
to recover damages caused to consumers. 67 The 1994 Antitrust Law expressly
provides that investigations and proceedings by the SDE and CADE do not preclude judicial recovery under the Consumer Protection Law.
Criminal offenses under Law 8.137/90 are punishable with fines or prison
sentences. Prison sentences range from one to five years. Fines are set by the
judge according to a complex formula contained in the law. 68 The prison sentences
can usually be replaced with fines following an equivalence formula set forth in
Law 8.137/90.69
B.

MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND JOINT VENTURES

The formal requirements for mergers are set forth in the Corporation Law.
A merger must be approved by the shareholders' assembly, after publication of
a protocol indicating the terms under which the merger will take place,770 Creditors
can bring judicial action after the merger to request its annulment. 1
Law 8.884/94 contains the new regulation of the antitrust aspects of mergers
and acquisitions. The 1994 law provides that any act that may lead to market
domination or that may limit competition is subject to a reporting requirement
for approval by CADE. Asset acquisitions, mergers, and joint ventures must be
reported for approval when they involve 20 percent or more of the relevant
market, or when any of the companies involved have annual gross revenues of
at least 100,000,000 UFIR (UFIR is a Brazilian unit of value based on a consumer
index established by the Brazilian Treasury Ministry on a quarterly basis). A
joint venture may be a violation of the antitrust laws if it is used as a means to

63. See Natureza Juridicado CADE, in FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41, at 531-37.
64. Law 8.884/94, arts. 46, 48.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. art. 59, § 1.
Law 9.069/69, art. 83.
Law 8.078, art. 82.
See Law 8.137/90, arts. 9, 10.
Id.
Corporation Law arts. 224, 227, § 1.For an English translation of the Brazilian Corporation

Law, see
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eliminate competition from the market.72 For purposes of analyzing antitrust
implications, CADE has indicated that a joint venture is an association between
enterprises, similar to an acquisition.73 A formal agreement is not required for
the existence of a joint venture; a joint venture can exist if there is a de facto
association between enterprises.74
CADE will authorize a merger, acquisition, or joint venture subject to the
reporting requirement only if it can be shown that productivity and/or quality
improvements result, the benefits are justly distributed among consumers and
producers, and competition is not substantially reduced in a sector of the market.75
The law does not provide guidance as to the means of determining productivity
gains, just distribution, or substantial reduction of competition.
Under previous statutes, the "failing company defense" has been accepted
by CADE and by the courts in cases of acquisitions, mergers, and joint ventures
when the deal prevents the company from filing for protection from creditors.76
CADE and the courts are likely to continue to apply their reasoning under the
1994 law.
C.

DISTRIBUTOR AGREEMENTS AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

An exclusivity clause, whereby a distributor agrees not to sell the products
of a different producer, is not a violation of the competition laws.77 Such a clause
would be a violation under the general provisions of the 1994 Antitrust Law only
if it is used to dominate the market and eliminate competition. 78 Also, a company
cannot impose on its distributors resale prices or any other conditions bearing
on the relationship between the distributor and third parties if the prices have
the purpose or the effect of restricting competition.7 9
In proceedings before the SDE and CADE under the previous statutes, an
exclusive distribution agreement was held to be a violation of the competition
laws if it was used to extend the market power of the producer downstream.8°
Vertical integration was considered to be a violation of the law whenever it was
72. Law 8.884/94, art. 54, § 3, amended by Law 9.021/95, art. 78; Judgment of Sept. 26,
1980, Processo Admin. no. 29 (Arg.); Judgment of July 7, 1977, Processo de Averiguarcoes Preliminares no. 67 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41, at 66, 368.
73. See, e.g., FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41, at 76.

74. Id. at 331.
75. Law 8.884/94, art. 54.
76. Sentenca de la instancia de 23 de abril de 1982, 6a Vara da Justica Federal de Sao Paolo;
Judgment of April 28, 1975, Processo de Averiguacoes Preliminares no. 50 (CADE). FRANCESCHINI,
supra note 41, at 68, 76-77.
77. See e.g., Judgment of May 27, 1976, Processo Admin. no. 17 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra
note 41, at 92.

78. Judgment of May 27, 1977, Processo Admin. no. 16 (Arg.);
at 88.

FRANCESCHINI,

supra note 41,

79. Law 8.884/94, art. 20, § XI.

80. Judgment of July 29, 1975, Processo de Averiguacoes Preliminares no. 52 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41, at 374.
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used to dominate the sources of supplies, or the channels of distribution, by
squeezing competitors out of the upstream or downstream markets. 81Other related
decisions of CADE, under previous statutes, held that producers cannot discriminate among distributors by favoring a privileged group over others.82 Volume
discounts, however, were held to be acceptable as long as they were reasonable
and were made available to all distributors.83 CADE also held, under previous
statutes, that producers can bypass distributors and sell directly to the public or
enter into competitive bids for distribution contracts with the government without
violating the competition laws. 84 Producers, it was held, can promise not to sell
directly to the public in competition with the distributors. Therefore, direct sales
to the public can be a violation of contractual obligations, but they are not a
violation of the competition laws. Since the current statute is more restrictive
than the previous ones, decisions by CADE under the old statutes are probably
a good indication of specific practices that will be considered to be anticompetitive
under the current statute.
D.

APPLICABLE LAWS

(i) Lei No. 9.069, Dispoe sobre o Plano Real, o Sistema Monetario Nacional,
establece as Regras e condicoes de emissao do Real e os criterios para
conversao das obrigacoespara o Real, e da outrasprovidencias, of June
29, 1995. Law 9.069/95 modifies Law 8.884. Law 9.069 establishes a
20 percent market share threshold for "abuses of economic power" and
abolishes the mechanism of private consultation established by Law 8.884/
94.
(ii) Lei No. 9.021, Dispoe sobre a implementacao da autarquia Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica-CADE, criada pela Lei n. 8.884, de
11 de junho de 1994, e da outras providencias, of March 30, 1995. Law
9.021/95 modifies certain procedures to be followed by CADE established
by Law 8.884/94.
(iii) Lei No. 8.884, Transforma o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica-CADE em Autarquia, dispoe sobre a prevencao e a repressao as infracoes contra a ordem economica, e da outrasprovidencias, of June 11,
1994 (Law 8.884/94), as modified by Law 9.021 of March 30, 1995. Law
8.884/94 is the basic antitrust framework in Brazil.

81. Judgment of March 22, 1971, Processo no. 20.049 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41,
at 96-97.
82. Judgment of April 26, 1976, Processo Admin. no. 10 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra note
41, at 119-20.
83. Id.; Judgment of July 8, 1971, Processo Admin. no. 8 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra note
41, at 122-23.
84. Judgment of Nov. 3, 1976, Processo Admin. no. 18 (Arg.); FRANCESCHINI, supra note 41,
at 117-18.
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(iv) Lei No. 8.13 7, define crimes contraa ordem tributaria,economica e contra
as relacoes de consumo, e da outrasprovidencias, of December 27, 1990
(Law 8.137/90), as reformed by Law 8.884/94. Law 8.137/90 establishes
criminal penalties for certain anticompetitive practices.
(v) Lei No. 8.078, Dispoe sobre a protecao do consumidor, e da outras providencias, of September 11, 1990 (Law 8.078/90). Law 8.078/90 prohibits
certain forms of anticompetitive conduct.
(vi) Lei 7.347, Disciplinaa acao civil publica de responsabilidadepor danos
causados ao meio ambiente, ao consumidor, a ordem economica, a bens
e direitos de valor artistico, estetico, historico, turistico e paisagistico(vetado), e da outras providencias, of July 24, 1985 (Law 7.347/85). Law
7.347/85 provides for class actions for damages to consumers.
(vii) Lei No. 6404, of December 15, 1976, effective February 1977 (Corporation
Law). The Corporation Law establishes formal requirements for mergers.
III. Competition Regulation in Chile
Chile has one of the most active systems of antitrust enforcement in Latin
America. An important reason for the development of the antitrust law in Chile
is the existence of a widespread commitment to the model of free market competition. Chilean companies seek to avoid being found guilty of anticompetitive
practices, since such a finding would reflect a negative image.
The antitrust enforcement institutions in Chile are quite active and have effective authority over the enforcement of the antitrust laws. The enforcement structure includes a central commission, regional commissions, an appellate commission, and a National Economic Attorney's office. Not only do these institutions
have broad investigative powers, but any private party can denounce violations
of the antitrust laws. It is common practice, for example, for a company to direct
an informal complaint to a competitor indicating that a violation is taking place.
Often, this kind of informal communication is sufficient to prompt a competitor
to cease a violation, since a complaint directed to the Commission could lead to
an investigation of the company.
The antitrust framework, Decree 211 (as revised and compiled by Decree 511
of 1980), contains a list of prohibited practices, including unilateral and bilateral
practices, horizontal and vertical restrictions, and a catch-all provision that declares illegal any conduct that restricts competition. This framework is very broad
and offers little guidance to determine the scope of application of the antitrust
laws. The Chilean antitrust regulation is characterized by fairly high levels of
uncertainty, which can be particularly troublesome for business. Broad antitrust
regulations that do not offer clear guidance to economic agents increase the risks,
and therefore the costs, of doing business. On the other hand, a rigid and detailed
antitrust framework could encroach on behavior that analyzed under the existing
statute, would be considered procompetitive by the enforcement bodies.
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An extensive body of decisions and the availability of a procedure of consultation whereby private parties can obtain an opinion from the government as to the
legality of a particular course of action, as described below, reduce the uncertainty
stemming from the broad antitrust statutes. In practice this procedure is a valuable
resource. The opinions issued in response to consultations can be used for guidance by other companies, which can rely on these opinions instead of making a
direct consultation.
The Chilean antitrust authorities are often well qualified in the field of economics. This fact is evidenced by certain decisions of the antitrust commissions
dealing with technical issues of economic regulation. Nevertheless, the antitrust
commissions have been criticized for lacking the necessary technical support to
research their cases adequately.85 Institutional competence helps to diminish,
although does not completely eliminate, the risk of erratic enforcement of the
broad Chilean antitrust laws.
A.

REGULATION OF COMPETITION

1. Enforcement Mechanism
Four government institutions are responsible for the investigation, prevention,
and correction of anticompetitive practices: the Regional Prevention Commissions; the Central Prevention Commission; the Resolving Commission; and the
National Economic Attorney's Office (National Attorney). In 1995 the Prevention
Commissions issued more than thirty-five decisions, and the Resolving Commission issued more than twenty-three, making Chilean antitrust enforcement one
of the most active in Latin America.
The Regional Prevention Commissions perform the following functions: answer inquiries by private parties as to the validity of acts or agreements in light
of the antitrust laws; request the National Attorney to investigate acts contrary
to free competition; apply, at the request of the National Attorney, preventive
measures to correct conduct that violates the antitrust laws, including suspension
of agreements or production quotas for as long as fifteen days or establishing
maximum sale prices for as long as fifteen days.86 The Central Prevention Commission performs these functions for the city of Santiago and in cases involving
the whole country or two or more regions.

85. See Susan Jackson, Playing Monopoly, Bus. LATIN AM., Jan. 22, 1996, at 3. This article
takes a political angle in its analysis of Chilean antitrust enforcement, concluding that "the underlying
problem is that there is no great interest in change according to one committee member . . . Also,
the government is not disposed at present to pick a battle with corporate interests, which comprise
much of the right wing opposition." The political argument should not be underestimated. However,
as the Chilean economy opens to international competition (especially if Chile joins NAFTA), this
argument becomes less persuasive.
86. Decree 211, § 8.
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The orders issued by the Regional and Central Prevention Commissions
can be appealed to the Resolving Commission. 87 Appeals must be brought
within three working days. This short period of limitations necessitates swift
action. The failure to appeal the decision within this time will result in the
loss of all recourse.
Besides hearing appeals, the Resolving Commission has important investigative
and enforcement functions. It can investigate ex officio, or at the request of the
National Attorney, any violation of Decree 211. The Resolving Commission can
impose sanctions for antitrust violations including: modifying or terminating
agreements, or ordering a party to cease conduct that violates the antitrust laws;
ordering the total or partial divestiture of a company; imposing fines for a sum
of up to 10,000 Tax Units (the Tax Unit, or UT, is a standard unit of reference
set monthly by the government for tax purposes in Chile); and requiring the
National Attorney to initiate proceedings for criminal violations. The Resolving
Commission can order provisional measures to stop the violations until it reaches
a final decision.
The decisions of the Resolving Commission, by express provision of Decree
211, cannot be appealed to the courts. 88 Excepted are those decisions ordering
the partial or total divestiture of a company, which can be appealed to the Supreme
Court. This provision on nonappealability is of questionable constitutional validity
since it withdraws a class of administrative decisions from all judicial control.
2. Practices Regulated by the Competition Laws
Any act or contract restricting competition in activities related to domestic or
89
international trade is punishable by criminal and civil penalties. Decree 211
includes a list of practices considered violations of the antitrust law when they
restrict competition: (i) the assignment of quotas among producers; (ii) the assignment of quotas among distributors; (iii) the allocation of market zones; (iv) the
granting of exclusive distribution rights to one distributor for the products of all
competing producers; (v) entering into price-fixing arrangements; (vi) entering
into agreements to prevent collective bargaining; and (vii) in general, all conduct
that tends to restrict or eliminate free competition. These provisions are couched
in very general terms.
The violations of the Antitrust Law have been defined with greater precision
by the Prevention Commissions. Even though the decisions of these bodies are
not legally binding, they carry considerable weight.
In practice, the Prevention and the Resolving Commissions are the main sources
of antitrust regulation. Since the Commissions have wide investigative and en87. Id. § 9.
88. Id. § 19.
89. Res. 46, Resolving Commission (Sept. 27, 1978) (holding that an actual anticompetitive
effect is not required by art. 1 of Decree 211).
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forcement powers and the antitrust laws in Chile, as opposed to those of many
other Latin American countries, are actively enforced, companies should abide
closely by their decisions.
In most cases, the Commissions have ruled that price-fixing was a per se
violation not requiring proof of market power or an anticompetitive impact on
the market, or even the existence of an actual benefit to the violators. 9° In one
decision, the Resolving Commission ordered the divestiture of a company that
had been formed for the purpose of reselling, at a fixed price, the products of
several competing manufacturers. 9' The Resolving Commission considered it
illegal for producers to suggest resale prices to the distributors or retailers of its
products. This practice was considered to be a violation, even if it did not result
in uniformity of prices in the market.92
Tying the sale of a product to the purchase of other products is also illegal.
The Resolving Commission, however, has permitted the sale of a product line
as a bundle. This exception is important since it allows the aggregation of different
goods to create a single product. Unclear are the criteria that would be used to
aggregate a product line so that it could be sold as a single product under the
antitrust laws.
Price discrimination is also prohibited. To determine price discrimination, the
Resolving Commission tries to establish whether objective criteria justify the
difference in prices and whether the criteria are consistently applied to all parties.
To be considered objective, the criteria used by the company should relate to
the characteristics of the sales transaction itself and should not depend on the
identity or activities of the purchaser. 93 Some of the criteria that justify price
differences are: discounts for volume; frequent purchases, which may justify
giving special prices to the purchaser; and form of payment and other factors
related to the sale. 94 Uniform prices must be available to all wholesale or retail
buyers purchasing under the same conditions. These conditions must be impartial
and objective and must be made known to all interested parties. 95 Discrimination
can exist when goods must be purchased along with other related goods (that is,
as a bundle of goods) if the requirement of uniform prices is not applied across
the board. However, since 1990 the Prevention Commission has begun to analyze
price discrimination cases on the basis of whether differences in costs justify

90. Res. 67, Resolving Commission (Oct. 31, 1979) (holding that a violator of the price-fixing
prohibition does not require the existence of anticompetitive impact).
91. Id., cited in JORGE CAREY, CHILE § 4.02 (1986).
92. Res. 56, Resolving Commission (Jan. 17, 1979) (holding that suggesting resale prices is
prohibited by Decree 211, even if it does not, in fact, result in uniform prices).
93. Res. 68, Resolving Commission (Oct. 31, 1979) (holding that an objective criterion should
relate to the sales transaction itself and should not depend on the activity of the purchaser).
94. C.P.C 291/689, 1981; C.P.C. 143/21, 1977; C.P.C. 155/286, 1977.
95. Res. 29, Resolving Commission (1977) (ordering a company to cease discrimination in prices
and other conditions that are not justified by objective criteria).
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differences in prices.96 This reflects a trend towards the application of economic
analysis by the enforcement bodies.
Unjustified refusals to sell are prohibited by the Consumer Protection Law. If
the product is normally available and a company refuses to sell to a particular customer, a violation of the law may occur. If the refusal is not justified by objective
criteria, the company may be prosecuted for violating the Consumer Protection
Law. The appointment of an exclusive purchaser of the complete product line of
an industry is a violation of the competition laws. If a producer sells to a retailer,
it must also sell to all other interested retailers under the same conditions. 97
Employment contracts prohibiting employees from working for a competitor
after termination are also a violation of the antitrust laws. 98 It is not clear if this
is a blanket prohibition, or if it would allow certain exceptions such as to protect
trade secrets.
B.

MERGERS

Mergers violate the antitrust laws if they affect a high percentage of the total
product offered on the market. 99 The Resolving Commission has accepted a form
of the failing company defense, and has allowed mergers involving a company
that would otherwise have filed for bankruptcy. This result illustrates the role
of the Commissions in creating important guidelines for the interpretation of the
antitrust laws.
A merger is usually achieved by creating a new company that assumes all the
rights and obligations of the merging companies. The procedure for mergers in
Chile is simple and is contained in a few articles of the Corporation Law. 00
C.

DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENTS AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

The Resolving Commission has penalized agreements under which a distributor
is required to distribute exclusively the products of one manufacturer.' 0 ' In practice, this provision is not as restrictive since it is possible to structure a relationship, through cost-sharing agreements for example, that will not violate the law.
These agreements must be on a case-by-case basis, using prior permitted exceptions, since no general formula exists to set up these arrangements.
96. C.P.C. 238/006, 1979. This situation is different from tying, which is illegal per se. Here,
the aggregation of products is legitimate, e.g., a line of product, but is applied in a discriminatory
manner. For an important analysis of the recent trends in Chilean antitrust enforcement, see Ricardo
Paredes M., Jurisprudenciade las Comisiones Antimonopolios en Chile, 58 ESTUDIOS POBLICOS
(Santiago de Chile, 1995).
97. Res. 19 (1975).
98. C.P.C. 335/538, 1982.
99. C.P.C. 282/536; CAREY, supra note 91.

100. Corporation Law arts. 99-100; see COMMERCIAL LAWS
Tax L. Ass'n, rev. 1990).
101. R.C. 90, 1981; CAREY, supra note 91, § 4.02[4].
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The Central Prevention Commission has found that resale price maintenance
infringes the antitrust laws. 102The decision generated some controversy within the
Commission, but it has become well-ingrained in legal and commercial practice
in Chile. Today manufacturers publish a list of prices at which they will sell to
distributors, but they will not suggest a resale price. Only if the distributors operate
as its agents can the producer indicate a resale price to them. If the distributor is
independent, that is, if it assumes the costs and risks of doing business, resale price
maintenance is illegal per se. 03
' Furthermore, to avoid price discrimination, producers should offer uniform prices to all distributors. " Offering special discounts
to some distributors and not to others is a violation of Decree 211.105
An agreement among competitors to assign an exclusive distributor for a product was found by the Commission to be a violation of the competition laws. 10
D.

APPLICABLE LAWS

(i) DecretoLey 211, of December 22, 1973, as revised and compiled by Decreto
511, in Diario Oficial, of October 27, 1980 (Decree 211). Decree 211 is
the basic antitrust framework in Chile and incorporates all previous law on
the subject. Decreto 511 contains the final systematized text of Decree 211.
(ii) Ley 18.223, in DiarioOficial of June 11, 1983 (Consumer Protection Law).
The Consumer Protection Law regulates, among other things, certain forms
of refusal to deal.
(iii) Ley No. 18.046, in Diario Oficial of October 22, 1981 (Corporation Law).
The Corporation Law establishes the formal requirements for a merger.
IV. Competition Regulation in Colombia
The enforcement of antitrust laws in Colombia is virtually nonexistent. Several
explanations can account for this void in the application of the law. One is that
Colombia has no monopolies. This explanation is very popular, and it is forcefully
promoted by the press.'07 It is disingenuous, however, to assert that monopolistic
102. C.P.C. 125/185, 1976; C.P.C. 134/250, 1976; CAREY, supra note 91, § 1[3].
103. Res. 48, Resolving Commission (Sept. 27, 1978) (holding that an independent merchant
should not be restricted as to which products it can sell or at what prices).
104. C.P.C. 280/988, 1981; CAREY, supra note 91, § 4.01[2].
105. Res. 35 (1977). A Chilean company was fined for offering discounts to distributors of liquid
fuels that were not offered to other retailers not distributing such fuels. The company's action was
determined to be a violation of Decree 211, "regardless of the relationship of the favored distributors
with the [company], of their financial capacity, and of the volume of business they conduct."
106. C.P.C. 232/249, 1979.
107. Cf, e.g., El Mito de los Monopolios en Colombia, REVISTA CRoMos, Aug. 16, 1993, at
34: "An ideology related to Marxism, that disregards the contributions of enterprises that have been
working for the progress of the country for over a hundred years, has been accusing these enterprises
of pernicious monopolistic practices. A level-headed study [of the subject] ... shows that in Colombia
monopolies do not, and cannot, exist." (Translation by the author.) Even though this article plausibly
argues that antitrust is unnecessary in an open economy, the article is written in vehement terms
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practices are nonexistent in Colombia. Another explanation is that antitrust is a
largely ignored and misunderstood field that has its origins in the common law
countries and is somewhat alien to the civil law tradition. The origins of antitrust
law may be one reason why Colombian law schools rarely teach antitrust law and
why few, if any, members of the bureaucracy are trained in antitrust enforcement.
Consequently, the economic analysis necessary for many instances of antitrust
enforcement is beyond the level of expertise of government institutions. Finally,
the most important factor is the absence of the necessary political will to pursue
enforcement of antitrust laws.
Whatever the reasons for lack of enforcement, the Colombian antitrust laws
have not been an obstacle to those who engage in anticompetitive practices. As
the open economy policies adopted by the last two governments take effect,
competition from international products may make these laws increasingly unnecessary. Thus, the entire issue of enforcement may become moot.
A.

REGULATION OF COMPETITION

1. Practices Regulated by the Competition Laws'0 8
According to the 1991 Colombian Constitution, monopolies can be established
only by law and in pursuit of the public interest.'09 The 1991 Colombian Constitution authorizes the state to adopt and enforce laws to prevent abuses of market
power and to protect the free market. "0
The Antimonopoly Law prohibits conduct directed at the monopolization of
distribution in a market. " ' The Antimonopoly Regulation prohibits abuses of
market power," 2 including: pricing below cost in order to eliminate competition
or to prevent entry; discriminating among suppliers or consumers in a way that
either places them at a disadvantage relative to the competition, or eliminates
or reduces competition in the market; tying unrelated conditions or obligations
to the supply of a product; selling in different parts of the country at different
prices, when the difference does not correspond to a difference in costs, and the
intention or effect is to reduce competition. ' These violations presuppose the
existence of market power, and therefore, are analyzed under a rule-of-reason
that are worthy of attention, especially since the magazine in question is owned by one of the
largest and most concentrated business conglomerates in Colombia. Cf. Jose de Cordoba, Colombian
Paradox: Embattled President Has Powerful Friend, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1996, at Al.
108. The competition laws include the Antimonopoly Law and its related provisions.
109. CONSTITucI6N POLTICA DE COLOMBIA [COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTION] art. 336.

110. Id. art. 333.
111. Ley 155 Sobre Pricticas Comerciales Restrictivas [Antimonopoly Law] art. 8 (Dec. 24,
1959). This provision has been interpreted as a prohibition of agreements aimed at controlling 50%
or more of the market. Investing, Licensing & Trading Conditions Abroad: Colombia (Economist
Intelligence Unit) § 5.1 (1996). This reading is not supported by the text of the law and its source
is not indicated.
112. Article 50 regulates unilateral conduct.
113. Decree 2153/92, art. 50.
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standard requiring an inquiry into the market structure and the effect of the
practice.
The Antimonopoly Law prohibits agreements or concerted action to fix the
price or quantity of the supply of goods or services. " 4 In 1992 the government
issued Decree 2153, which included new provisions that prohibit agreements or
concerted action to allocate markets, sources of supplies, or quotas of production
or distribution. "' These provisions seem to establish a per se violation whenever
one of these agreements is reached.
The Antimonopoly Law protects independent distributors from disloyal competition by the producer, its affiliates, or its subsidiaries that sell the same products
directly to the market. 116 It provides that acts of disloyal competition constitute
a transgression of the Antimonopoly Law. "' Acts of disloyal competition were
recently defined as "acts . . . contrary to fair commercial practice, commercial
good faith . . . [or which have an adverse impact] on the [free] operation of
competition in the markets." 8 Acts of disloyal competition include those that:
mislead customers as to the identity of a company or the quality or origin of a
product; damage a competitor through industrial espionage, false statements, or
disturbing the operations of its enterprise; and produce chaos in the market. '
The notions of disloyal competition and commercial good faith are broad notions,
lacking a precise meaning, used by the legislature as a backdrop for the interpretation of the prohibitions enacted in the law.
Decree 2153/92 prohibits agreements or concerted action that discriminate
against third parties in the price or conditions of a sales transaction.1° Decree
2153/92 prohibits tying to a contract additional obligations not related to its
nature. These conducts are per se violations of the law.
Boards of directors overlapping among firms producing the same goods or
services are prohibited. This prohibition applies also to administrators and managers. "' The Antimonopoly Law prohibits members of the board of directors,
managers, presidents, and legal representatives from selling products of the company privately, either directly or through an intermediary. ' Additionally, these
people are barred from owning other companies that produce or sell the same
goods or services. 2 3 The latter prohibition also extends to immediate family
Antimonopoly Law art. 1, amended by the 1963 Amendment to the Antimonopoly Law;
2153/92, art. 45.
Decree 2153/92, art. 47. For a discussion on the constitutionality of this Decree, see Enrique
Gutidrrez, Nuevas DisposicionesSobre PrdcticasComerciales Restrictivas, in NUEVAS ORIENTACIONES DEL DERECHO COMERCIAL (1993).

114.
Decree
115.
Gaviria

116. Antimonopoly Law art. 7.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. art. 8.
Ley 256 de 1996 por la cual se dictum normas sobre competencia desleal [Law 256 of 1996].
Id. art. 11.
Decree 2153/92, art. 47.
Antimonopoly Law art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Id.
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members.1 24 The Antimonopoly Regulation establishes an annual reporting requirement for companies subject to administrative supervision. The annual report
must list all directors, officers, and administrative personnel to facilitate compliance with the above-mentioned restrictions.'25
Decree 2153/92 prohibits agreements or concerted action to suppress techno26
1
logical developments or to stop or reduce the supply of products or services.
27
1
violation.
criminal
a
is
consumption"
"popular
of
Hoarding a product
It is a violation of the Antimonopoly Law to engage in advertising that violates
the Consumer Protection Law, to induce or force a company to increase its prices,
28
and to refuse to deal with a company in retaliation for its price policies.1
Application of the antimonopoly rules is subject to three exceptions. Exempt
are: cooperative scientific or technological projects; agreements to comply with
nonmandatory industry standards,29 norms, and measures; and agreements related
to the use of common facilities. 1
2. Enforcement Procedures
The Superintendency, the body charged with enforcing the antitrust laws, may
upon a private complaint, or ex officio, investigate any violation of the competition
laws. 30 The complaints brought to the Superintendency are evaluated by the
Competition
Division 13' and, if they are substantial, an investigation may be
32
1
initiated.
The investigation is conducted in a confidential manner. The Superintendency
has broad powers to solicit information from the companies or persons under
investigation. 33 As a preliminary measure, the4 Superintendency may order the
company to suspend the conduct in question.1
Once the investigation is concluded, the party has up to thirty days to respond
to any charges.135 If a violation of the competition laws has taken place, the
Superintendency 136 may order the company to modify or cease the illegal con124. Id.
125. Antimonopoly Regulation art. 14, amended by Decree 2153/92, art. 2, § 1 (assigning the
function of supervising compliance with the competition laws to the Superintendency of Industry
and Commerce).
126. Decree 2153/92, art. 47.
127. C6DIGO PENAL [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 229. The law includes, among the list of "products
of popular consumption" several oil and coal derivatives of widespread use.
128. Decree 2153/92, art. 48.
129. Id. art. 49.
130. Antimonopoly Law art. 12, amended by art. 2 of the 1961 Amendment to the Antimonopoly
Law, amended by arts. 2, 4, & 53 of Decree 2153/92.
131. Divisi6n de Promoci6n de la Competencia.
132. Decree 2153/92, art. 12.
133. Antimonopoly Law art. 13.
134. Decree 2153/92, art. 4.
135. Antimonopoly Law art. 13.
136. The superintendent will determine the sanctions after consulting with the Advisory Committee
of the Superintendency. Decree 2153/92, art. 24.
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to administrative supervision for the amount
duct 37 and may subject the company
38
of time it deems necessary.
The Antimonopoly Regulation establishes semiannual reporting requirements
for companies subject to administrative supervision. These requirements include
submitting information about balances, market structure, cost structure, taxes,
marketing systems, and personnel. "9This administrative supervision regime may
also be applied to companies that have the capacity to determine market prices. 140
The Superintendency may impose other sanctions for the transgression of the
competition laws, including: retiring the company from the list of publicly traded
companies;141 fining the company for a maximum amount of 2000 minimum legal
daily salaries;' 42 and fining the administrators, directors, managers,
and auditors
43
for a maximum amount of 300 minimum legal daily salaries. 1
By express legal provision, contracts entered in violation of the Antimonopoly
Law are unenforceable, and companies that are repeat offenders of the competition
laws may be dissolved by order of the Superintendency.'"
Pursuant to a recently adopted law regulating unfair commercial practices,
parties affected by acts of "disloyal competition" may (i) seek an injunction to
prevent damages arising out of disloyal conduct by other economic actors, and
(ii) may request reparation for damages incurred as a result of such conduct.145
B.

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

The Antimonopoly Law explicitly authorizes resale price maintenance. When
a company sets the price of a good or service for sale to the public, it is an
act of disloyal competition for the company, its affiliates, its distributors, or
independent sellers to sell the product at a different price. 46 This rule protects,
and seems to encourage, resale price maintenance.
C. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

1. Procedurefor Mergers
The Commercial Code establishes the legal procedure for a merger. 47 The
merger must be approved by the Board of Shareholders or the Assembly and
137. Decree 2153/92, art. 4.
138. Antimonopoly Law art. 17.
139. Antimonopoly Regulation art. 2.
140. Antimonopoly Law art. 2.
141. Id. art. 14, amended by art. 2 of the 1962 amendment to the Antimonopoly Law, amended
by Decree 2153/92, arts. 2, 4, & 53.
142. Decree 2153/92, art. 4.
143. Id.
144. Id. art. 46; Antimonopoly Law art. 19.
145. Law 256 of 1996, art. 20.
146. Antimonopoly Law art. 9.
147. Acquisitions are governed by the general provisions of the contract of sale applied to corporations.
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must follow the procedures established in the corporate charter for mergers or
for an early dissolution. The agreement must be published in a national newspaper
and can be challenged by creditors within thirty days. Creditors may initiate
proceedings in court to obtain adequate security for their credit. Once the thirtyday period 8elapses, or once the proceedings are completed, the merger can be
4
executed.
2. Application of the Competition Laws to Mergers and Acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions of companies producing or distributing the same
product 149 must be reported to the Competition Division of the Superintendency
for approval. 50 The report must include, among other documents, a certificate
from the Superintendency stating that the applicants have not been sanctioned
for violations of the competition laws; a description of the mode of operation
and distribution; a description of the market; and a copy of the balance sheets,
the corporate articles, and the merger resolution.' 5
The Superintendent may object to the merger or acquisition within thirty days,
if the deal restricts competition. If no objection is made within thirty days, the
parties may proceed with the merger or acquisition. 152 The Antimonopoly Regulation establishes presumptively that a merger or acquisition will unduly restrict
competition when it is preceded by price-fixing or market-allocation arrangements
or when the conditions in the market are such that the merger or acquisition is
likely to result in an increase in prices. ' The Superintendency will not object
to a merger or acquisition if the parties can demonstrate the likelihood of significant gains in efficiency 54that cannot be achieved, or by other means guarantee
no decrease in supply. 1
A merger or acquisition authorization can be suspended or revoked at any time
if the company is found guilty of a violation of the competition laws.'55 However,
no merger, acquisition, or joint venture appears to have been prevented or modified on antitrust grounds.

148. For an English translation of the relevant provisions of the Commercial Code on mergers,
see COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: COLOMBIA arts. 172-80, 42 (Foreign Tax L. Ass'n, rev.

1983).
149. The article's wording refers to companies producing the same goods. It is not clear whether
this provision would be applied literally. If applied literally, it would not appear to cover mergers
or acquisitions of companies producing close, or perfect, substitutes.
150. Antimonopoly Law art. 4; Decree 2153/92, art. 12.
151. Antimonopoly Regulation art. 10.
152. Antimonopoly Law art. 4, amended by art. 2 of the 1963 Amendment to the Antimonopoly
Law, amended by Decree 2153/92, arts. 2, 4, & 53; Decree 2153/92, art. 4.
153. Antimonopoly Regulation art. 6.
154. Decree 2153/92, art. 51.
155. Antimonopoly Regulation art. 12.
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FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATIONS

The Financial Regulation of 1993,156 the regulatory framework for the insurance and financial sectors in Colombia, includes provisions that seek to prevent
anticompetitive practices in the financial sector and in the insurance industry. It
prohibits any concerted conduct seeking to restrict, impede, or distort competition
in the financial sector or in the insurance industry.' 57 The Superintendency of
Banks 5 8 may issue an order directing those guilty of practices contrary to the
provisions of the Regulation to cease such practices and may impose sanctions. 159
The Financial Regulation of 1991 allows injured parties to bring class actions
seeking damages for prohibited anticompetitive practices.' 60 This provision is
innovative and is not present in the antitrust regulations of the other countries
reviewed in this article.
E.

ANDEAN PACT REGULATIONS

In 1991 the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement,' 6' the governing body
of the Andean Pact, 162 issued a resolution establishing the Andean Pact competition
rules. 163 These rules apply to enterprises that conduct economic activities in several countries in the Andean Pact or enterprises based in one of the member
countries whose anticompetitive activities have an impact on other member countries.64 The member countries or enterprises affected may bring a request before
the Board of the Andean Pact (Board),1 65 the technical body in charge of securing
compliance with the tenets of the Pact, seeking measures to correct an anticompetitive practice.
The conduct regulated by the competition rules of the Andean Pact falls within
two broad categories: (i) bilateral practices, including agreements and other concerted practices to fix prices, set maximum volumes of production, allocate markets, and tie in the sale of products with the sale of other products not normally
sold as a bundle; 166 and (ii) abuse of a dominant position in the market, including
156. Estatuto Orgtnico del Sector Financiero, Decreto Ntdmero 663 de 1993 (Apr. 2, 1993).
157. Financial Regulation of 1993, art. 98. Only bilateral conduct is prohibited in this Regulation.
158. Superintendencia Bancaria.
159. Financial Regulation of 1993, art. 98.
160. Id.§ 3.
161. Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena.
162. The Andean Pact was formed in 1969 in an effort to create an intraregional common market.
The original members were Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. In 1973 Venezuela joined
the Andean Pact, and in 1976 Chile withdrew its membership. The current members are: Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The Andean Pact has had questionable success, since its
policies have often been neglected by member countries. However, in the last four years the Andean
Pact has been revitalized, especially because intraregional trade has been steadily increasing.
163. Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Decisi6n 285 de 1991 [hereinafter Decision 285/91].
164. Id.art. 2.
165. Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena.
166. Decision 285/91, art. 4.
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setting prices at a level that does not correspond to those that would prevail in
normal commercial transactions, 67 limiting the quantity of a product in the market, refusals to deal, and the use of tie-in arrangements. 168
To determine the existence of an anticompetitive practice, the Board will consider the following factors: the impact of the practice on the quantity of the
product in the relevant market; the practice's impact on price; and other relevant
considerations in general.' 69 If the Board finds practices to be anticompetitive,
it may issue a decision prohibiting the conduct in question and may order the
necessary measures to eliminate the anticompetitive practices. The member countries should take the necessary measures to comply with the order. 70 The countries
affected by the anticompetitive practices are expressly authorized to levy a specific
protective tariff for the products that are the object of the anticompetitive conduct. "' This supranational body of antitrust legislation, like other antitrust statutes
in the countries of the region, has not been enforced.
F.

APPLICABLE LAWS

(i) Ley 155 Sobre PrdcticasComerciales Restrictivas, of December 24, 1959
(Antimonopoly Law). The Antimonopoly Law protects competition in the
market and is the basic antitrust law in Colombia.
(ii) Decreto 3307, of December 30, 1963 (1963 Amendment to the Antimonopoly Law).
(iii) Decreto 1302 de 1964, por el cual se reglamenta la ley 155 de 1959, of
June 1, 1964 (Antimonopoly Regulation). The Antimonopoly Regulation
develops the provisions of the Antimonopoly Law.
(iv) C6digo de Comercio de Colombia, articles 172-180 (Commercial Code).
The Commercial Code includes provisions on mergers and unfair competition.
(v) Constituci6n Politica de Colombia (1991 Colombian Constitution). According to the 1991 Colombian Constitution, monopolies can be established
only by law.
(vi) Decreto 2153 de 1992, por el cual se Reestructurala Superintendenciade
Industria y Comercio, of December 30, 1992 (Decree 2153/92). Decree
2153/92 establishes mechanisms for the enforcement of the Antimonopoly
Law.
167. This criterion is not very clear. It is not clear how a normal commercial transaction test
would be applied to determine if there is an abuse in pricing. The price that is set by normal commercial
practices in the region may be a monopolist's price. An objective criterion, such as the international
price of the product, would be easier to apply.
168. Decision 285/91, art. 5.
169. Id. art. 13.
170. Id. art. 16. The specific mechanism to obtain enforcement is not set in place by the law.
This fact obviously weakens the effectiveness of this regulation.
171. Id.
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(vii) Ctdigo Penal (Criminal Code). The Criminal Code establishes criminal
penalties for hoarding products of popular consumption.
(viii) Estatuto Orgdnico del Sector Financiero,Decreto Namero 663 de 1993,
of April 2, 1993 (Financial Regulation of 1993). The Financial Regulation
of 1993 is the framework regulation for the Financial and Insurance sectors.
It prohibits certain anticompetitive practices in these sectors.
(ix) Decisi6n 285 de 1991 de la Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena(Andean
Pact Decision 285). Andean Pact Decision 285 regulates anticompetitive
practices within countries of the Andean Pact.
(x) Ley 256 de 1996 por la cual se dictum normas sobre competencia desleal,
(Law 256 of 1996). Regulates disloyal competition and repeals article 10
of the Antitrust Law and articles 75-77 of the Commercial Code.
V. Competition Regulation in Mexico
The 1992 Mexican competition law was received as a well drafted and economically sound regulation. Antitrust enforcement in Mexico has never been very
forceful, but the technocratic orientation of the last two governments, the free
market policies they have promoted, and the 1992 enactment of the new antitrust
statute are the main reasons why antitrust enforcement has become more prevalent. Whereas before the enactment of the 1992 competition law antitrust enforcement was almost unheard of in Mexico, the statistics reported in the 1994 Annual
Report of the Federal Competition Commission (the Commission), the body in
charge of antitrust enforcement in Mexico, show that antitrust enforcement is
on the rise in Mexico.
In 1993-94 the Commission performed sixteen ex officio investigations of
practices of economic agents in several sectors of the economy, including credit
cards, gasoline distribution, and the brokerage of government securities. The
commission found violations in six of these ex officio investigations.172 During
that same period, private parties brought twenty-two complaints before the Commission, sixteen of which were dismissed as lacking merit.1 3 The participants
the Commission of their
in four mergers were sanctioned for failing to notify
74
operation as required by the 1992 antitrust law.1
Traditionally, the state and the private sector in Mexico have been interdependent. Businesses would often obtain special concessions from the government
to perform a particular economic activity. Inasmuch as business may still depend
on certain concessions from the government, whether explicit or implicit, independent antitrust enforcement may be an important complement to free-trade
policies in order to help facilitate a competitive economy.

172. FEDERAL COMPETITION COMMISSION,

173. Id. at 47.
174. Id.
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REGULATION OF COMPETITION

1. Practices Regulated by the Competition Laws
The Mexican Constitution proscribes monopolies and any form of arrangement
to increase prices or reduce the supply of a product in the market. 75
' Article 28
establishes that government monopolies, 17labor
unions,
and
patent
and
copyright
6
holders are not included as monopolies.
The Competition Law is a regulation issued pursuant to Article 28 of the
Mexican Constitution. It is a comprehensive antitrust framework regulating conduct that restricts the efficient operation of the free market. 117The conduct covered
by the Competition Law falls within three broad categories: "absolute monopolistic activities," which consist of certain types of agreements or concerted action
among competitors; "relative monopolistic practices," which do not necessarily
involve collusion among competitors and are a violation only if the agent has
market power, and the conduct restricts or is intended to restrict competition;
and mergers and acquisitions that restrict competition.
The Competition Law 7 8 prohibits "absolute monopolistic practices," which
include all agreements or collusive action among competitors to: fix prices or
exchange price information to facilitate price fixing; restrict the supply of a
product or service; allocate markets or portions of markets, clients, or suppliers;
or place coordinated bids in competitive bidding contests. These are per se violations of the Competition Law. "9
The Competition Law 8° also prohibits "relative monopolistic practices,"
which include all "acts, contracts, agreements, and combinations whose purpose
or effect is to displace other agents in the market, prevent their access, or give
one of them special advantages" through one of the following: (i) establishing
exclusive distribution of goods or services; (ii) establishing the resale prices or
sales conditions that must be observed by a distributor or provider (resale price
maintenance); (iii) tying the purchase or sale of a product to the purchase or sale
of another product normally distinguishable, or establishing reciprocity conditions; (iv) agreeing not to deal with other purchasers or sellers; (v) refusing to
deal with a third party when it is normal practice to deal with third parties in
the type of transaction involved; (vi) seeking, through a group effort, to compel
a client or supplier to undertake a particular course of action; or (vii) engaging
in any other conduct that restricts competition.

175.

CONSTITUCI6N POU TICA DE Los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art.

28.

176. Id.

177. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [Competition Law) art. 2 (Dec. 18, 1992).
178. Id. art. 9.
179. See, e.g., Jeffrey Zuckerman, Competition, Competing Approaches in Latin America, INT'L
CoRP. L., Apr. 1993. For an in-depth study of the Mexican antitrust laws, see INGID GIULIANA
Rossi, LA LEGISLACI6N DE LA COMPETENCIA EN MXICO.

180. Competition Law art. 10.
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Relative monopolistic practices are not per se violations of the Competition
Law. In order for these practices to constitute a violation, market power must
exist in the relevant market. In order to determine the existence of market power,
article 13 of the Competition Law.8' establishes a number of factors that should
be considered: (i) the capacity of the company to determine prices or reduce the
supply of a product in the market whenever there are no actual or potential means
by which competitors can counteract such power; (ii) barriers to entry; (iii) the
existence and market power of competitors; (iv) the access of the company and
its competitors to sources of supplies; (v) the recent conduct of the company;
and (vi) other criteria as may be adopted by the regulations to the Competition
Law. In defining the relevant market the Competition Law 182 considers the existence and availability of adequate substitutes in the market and the possibility of
access to other markets, domestic or international, to obtain the goods or services
in question, taking into consideration the cost, time, and legal restrictions.
In order to determine when a merger, acquisition, or other concentration among
economic agents violates the Competition Law, the Commission 183 will consider
the relevant market,'" the degree of concentration and market power of the agent
and its competitors using the same criteria as set forth in article 13,185 and other
18 6
criteria that may be adopted by future regulations to the Competition Law.
2. Enforcement Procedures
The Commission can investigate anticompetitive practices, relative or absolute,
that violate the Competition Law.' 87 The investigation can be initiated ex officio
or upon a private party complaint.' 88 A private party will have standing to bring
a complaint to the Commission in all cases of "absolute monopolistic activities."
In cases of "relative monopolistic activities" or concentrations (mergers and the
like), a private party must show that it has been harmed by the practice. 89
Finally, the Competition Law gives a cause of action for damages to private
parties. Injured parties may bring a tort action in court to recover for damages
resulting from violations of the Competition Law.
3. Sanctions
The Commission can impose sanctions that include: (i) ordering the transgressors to cease or modify their conduct; (ii) ordering the partial or total divestiture

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. art. 13.
Id. art. 12.
Comisi6n Federal de la Competencia.
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
Competition Law art. 13.
Id. art. 18.
Id. art. 24.
Id. art. 30.
Id. art. 32.
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of the concentration; (iii) fines on the company of up to 7,500 minimum daily
salaries' 90for giving false information to the Commission, up to 375,000 minimum
daily salaries for entering into an "absolute monopolistic activity," up to 225,000
minimum daily salaries for entering into a "relative monopolistic activity," up
to 225,000 minimum daily salaries for entering into an unlawful concentration,
up to 100,000 minimum salaries for failing to notify the Commission of a concentration when it was required by the Competition Law to do so, and up to 100,000
minimum salaries for other practices that harm competition; and (iv) fines of
up to 7,500 minimum salaries on the individuals that take part in one of these
transgressions. These fines may be doubled in the case of repeat offenses. The
Commission may impose a fine equivalent to 10 percent of the annual sales or
10 percent of the assets of a company, whichever is higher, when the violation
is particularly serious. 19'
Once the Commission determines that an economic agent has transgressed the
Competition Law, private parties that have been injured may bring suit before
the courts to recover damages.' 92
Moreover, agreements entered into in transgression of the Competition Law's
provisions against absolute monopolistic practices are null and void.' 93
B.

MERGERS

The General Law of Mercantile Companies establishes the requirements for
mergers in Mexico. First, the merger resolution must be adopted pursuant to the
company's articles of incorporation and must meet the legal requirements established for the specific kind of corporation or partnership. 194Also, the merger resolution must be published in the Public Register and in the Official Gazette and must
be accompanied by a balance sheet of the merging companies and a statement as
to the procedure that will be followed to extinguish the liabilities. 195 Creditors may

190. The minimum daily salary is set periodically by the National Commission of Minimum
Salaries, a government body that includes representatives from the government, the private sector,
and the workers' unions. As of April 25, 1996, the minimum daily salary was set at an equivalent
of US $3.05.
191. Competition Law art. 37.
192. Id. art. 38.
193. Id. art. 9.
194. Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [General Law of Mercantile Companies] art. 222
(Aug. 4, 1934). "The merger of companies must be decided by each of them in the manner and
terms according to their nature."
195. General Law of Mercantile Companies art. 223. "Resolutions to merge shall be recorded
Each company must
in the Public Register of Commerce and published in the Official Gazette ....
publish its last balance sheet and . . . the procedure adopted for extinguishing their liabilities."

Translated in COMMERCIAL
rev. 1996).

LAWS OF THE WORLD:

MEXICO (Book 1) 333 (Foreign Tax L. Ass'n,
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oppose the merger in court within three months of publication. 196 At the end of this
period, if the creditors have not opposed it, the merger can proceed.
The Commission must be notified of mergers or other combinations of enterprises when the companies surpass certain monetary thresholds. The Competition
Law requires that the Commission be notified of the following concentrations
before they take place: (i) when the transaction involves a sum larger than the
equivalent of twelve million times the minimum legal salary in the Federal District; (ii) if the transaction results in the accumulation of more than 35 percent
of the assets of a company with assets or sales greater than twelve million times
the minimum legal salary in the Federal District; or (iii) when the transaction
involves two or more companies with joint assets or sales of more than forty-eight
million times the minimum legal salary in the Federal District and will generate
an additional concentration of assets or capital superior to 4.8 million times the
minimum legal salary in the Federal District.' 97
The notification must be in writing with a full description of the parties involved,
the transaction, market share, and recent financial statements. 198 The Commission
has twenty days to request additional information and forty-five days to issue a
determination. In exceptionally difficult cases, the Commission will have sixtyfive additional days to issue a determination.' 99 A favorable resolution by the
Commission will not exonerate the parties from liability for other violations, but
the concentration itself cannot be challenged under the Competition Law. 200
If no response is issued after the forty-five-day period expires, the silence of
the Commission should be interpreted as approval of the transaction. As a result,
the Commission has been very efficient in addressing these notifications. It has
issued a decision within the established period in virtually all the merger cases
20
that have come before it. '
Failure to make the required notification to the Commission before proceeding
with a merger may result in sanctions. According to the 1994 Annual Report of
the Commission, in four occasions during 1993-94 companies involved in mergers
were sanctioned for failing to report the transaction for review by the Commission.20 2 Additionally, concentrations that do not require prior notification cannot
be challenged by the Commission after one year of their occurrence.2 3

196. General Law of Mercantile Companies art. 224. "In this lapse of time [three months] any
creditor of the merging companies may start summary proceedings to oppose the merger ......
197. Id.
198. Competition Law art. 21.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Rogelio Lopez Velarde, Antitrust in Mexico: A First, INT'L Bus. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 85.

202. 1993-1994

ANNUAL REPORT,

203. Competition Law art. 22.
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RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

Resale price maintenance is not a per se violation of the law. It can be a
violation only if the company has market power, that is, the power to determine
prices in all or in part of the country.204
The Competition Law does establish that the sharing of price information with
the purpose of fixing prices is a per se violation of the law. The lists used by
the company for purposes of setting the resale price should, therefore, be kept
exclusively for internal company circulation.
D.

APPLICABLE LAWS

(i) Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, article 28 (Mexican Constitution). The Mexican Constitution includes provisions against price-fixing
and other anticompetitive practices.
(ii) Ley Federalde Competencia Econ6mica, of December 18, 1992 (Competition Law). The Competition Law regulates anticompetitive practices.
(iii) Ley Generalde Sociedades Mercantiles, of August 4, 1934, articles 222-28
(General Law of Mercantile Companies). The General Law of Mercantile
Companies establishes the formal requirements for mergers.
VI. Conclusion
Antitrust enforcement has traditionally been weak in Latin America. Of the
countries reviewed in this article, Brazil and Chile have had relatively active
antitrust enforcement. In the last two years, antitrust enforcement has become
more prevalent in Mexico. Colombia's antitrust laws, as well as those of the
Andean Pact, remain largely unenforced.
The opening of the economies of Latin America has generated a heightened
awareness of the need to promote competition by creating regulatory frameworks
conducive to that end. Paradoxically, the need for antitrust enforcement is dramatically reduced by the opening of the economies to international competition.
Antitrust regulation is a power tool for state intervention in the economy. If
it is administered in an economically sound manner, it can promote competition;
if it is enforced in an erratic manner, or without sound economic analysis, it can
become a source of economic uncertainty and obstruction.

204. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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